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October 1992
Vol. 3, No. 2
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Nicholas J. Healy Admiralty Lectureship established at NYU Law School
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New York University has announced the establishment of the Nicholas J. Healy Lecture on Admiralty Law. The lectures will be held bi-annually and will coincide with the fall meetings of the Maritime Law Association held in New York. The inaugural lecture will be held on Thursday evening, November 5, 1992, at 5:00 p.m. It will given by the Honorable John R. Brown of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and will be held at the Tishman Auditorium of New York University Law School. Judge Brown will speak on "Admiralty Judges: Flotsam on the Sea of Maritime Law?"
The lectureship has been established by partners and other friends of Mr. Healy as a testimonial to his career of over 50 years as a practitioner and professor in the field of admiralty and as author of books and articles on maritime law subjects.
Everyone is invited to attend. A reception in honor of Mr. & Mrs. Healy and Judge and Mrs. Brown will be held immediately following the lecture in the Greenburg Lounge between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. The law school is located in Vanderbilt Hall, 40 Washington Square South, New York, New York.
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Alexandra Lyras, a 1989 cum laude graduate of Duke University and a 1992 graduate of the Fordham University School of Law, joined Healy & Baillie in September 1992 as an associate. She has been a research assistant to Prof. Joseph Sweeney of Fordham Law School and has done extensive research on the U.S. Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Her hobbies include soccer, scuba diving and swimming.
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Alexandros Vassiliou of Athens, Greece, who has just received an LL.M. degree in International Commercial Law from the N.Y.U. Law School joined Healy & Baillie as a foreign trainee on September 9, 1992. Mr. Vassiliou received his earlier law degree from the University of Athens School of Law in January 1991. Prior to coming to the United States he had been a trainee with the law firm of P. Sotiropoulos, former president of the Greek Maritime Law Association, and with Anastasios P. Zolotas & Partners in Athens and had been with the NATO Base of COMEDEAST in Greece. In addition to Greek and English, he speaks French and German.
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Gordon W. Paulsen has been appointed Chairman of a Committee on Marine Salvage Issues by the National Research Council, which is the principal operating agency of the National Academy of Sciences to serve U.S. government and private organizations. The work of the committee will largely be focused on problems resulting from the absolute prohibition under OPA '90 of electing to risk the consequences of a deliberate spill, even in order to minimize damage from a casualty such as a stranding. On Tuesday, February 23, 1993 a symposium on this subject will be held at the Academy at 2101 Constitution Avenue, Washington, D.C. If you are interested in receiving an invitation, please contact Gordon Paulsen.
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John C. Koster and Matthew A. Marion
OPA '90 "OPERATIONAL CHECK LIST" II
The favorable response to our oil spill check list published in "MAINBRACE" Vol. 2, Issue No. 2 (November 1991) has prompted us to provide a new and somewhat more specific check list designed to enable organizations concerned with the provisions of OPA '90 -- primarily tank vessel owners -- with a means of evaluating their "pollution survey" readiness.
For copies of the 1991 Oil Pollution Check List, contact John Koster at 212-943-3980.
Subject to the same limitations attaching to our prior check list, we offer the following as a means of spot-checking within an organization its readiness to respond to an actual oil spill:
I. ON-SHORE PERSONNEL
a. Qualified Individual
Have you appointed a Qualified Individual (person or company) and a backup (if the Q.I. is a person) to coordinate pollution cleanup and response action with the Federal On-Scene Coordinator and state officials, and to attend the site on Owner's behalf? The Qualified Individual must have express authority to execute contracts with cleanup contractors and otherwise act as the shipowner's stand-in.
b. Cleanup Contractors
Do you have Occupational Safety & Health Act (O.S.H.A.) certified cleanup contractors and cleanup supervisors under contract directly or through your P&I club in each geographic area in which your vessels are expected to trade? Do these contractors have equipment sufficient to respond to spills ranging from 50 barrels to the vessel's entire cargo? Can they respond to spills within the deadlines set by the Coast Guard and applicable state law?
c. Shore-based Command Structure
Does the vessel owner/manager have a pre-arranged command structure to provide back-up notification to federal and state government officials, technical assistance through stability and strength calculations, documentation concerning the vessel and crew, and public relations guidance?
d. Public Relations
(External.) Do you have an experienced and skilled public relations firm familiar with your company (in advance) and available under contract, either directly or through your Club?
(Internal.) Are you ready to deal directly with the press? In the first few hours and days after a major casualty, information may have to be provided to the press in the best interests of the vessel and her Owner, even before a well-informed professional public relations organization can be brought in. Owners should consider maintaining an up-to-date information file on each vessel (classification society information, dates of recent surveys, crew lists, nationality and training, etc.). Recent experience has indicated there will be an almost immediate demand for such information by the press and it should be easily located and readily available.
A succinct statement of the ownership of the vessel (not the mere recitation of the name of e.g. a Liberian or Panamanian, etc., company) should also be considered in the event such disclosure is deemed appropriate to forestall the circulation of inaccurate or misleading information. A prototype of such a fact sheet -- perhaps for internal reference only -- is appended.
II. VESSEL BASED OPERATIONS
a. On-Board Command Structure
Have you appointed an officer to supervise implementation of the vessel response plan, including notifying appropriate parties of a spill or threatened spill and taking prompt steps to contain the spill? This officer might also oversee crew training and cleanup drills.
b. Crew Training and Licenses
Each crewman should receive training appropriate for his particular duties under the plan.
Drills. The vessel is already required to perform a certain number of drills -- fire drills, man-overboard drills, lifeboat drills, etc. -- and has a set number of watch routines -- anchoring, loading, etc. To the extent implementation of a response plan under some or all of the circumstances described above can replicate existing drills or station bills and remain effective, it obviously affords some advantages. Such a procedure reduces the number of functions any particular individual may have to remember and minimizes duplication of effort. Under the proposed regulations the vessel must conduct monthly drills.
Also, is your vessel fully manned by appropriately licensed personnel? Will the crew pass the Coast Guard's drug and alcohol tests?
c. Documentation
The vessel must retain records of all training drills and crew certifications. The monthly drills should be described in the ship's logs.
III. STATE LAW
Non-Preemption of State Law -- United States federal law does not preempt state water pollution law. Nonetheless, it remains unclear whether OPA's "permission" will be confined to the liability and limitation of liability provisions of state law or will be extended incrementally to permit states to legislate in the areas of vessel operations, regulation and equipment. Is your chartering department up-to-date on the latest state laws covering state-mandated response plans and pollution equipment so that your vessels do not undertake chartering commitments they cannot fulfill?
IV. CORPORATE ISSUES
Corporate Integrity -- The maintenance of corporate "separateness" to the degree possible is especially important under the substantial liability provisions of OPA '90. Much has been written about what can or cannot be done. What can or cannot be done in a particular case obviously depends on the nature of the vessel's operations, the type of ownership required, given all other considerations, and the degree to which requirements of the vessel's country of corporate ownership, flag and/or financial requirements (e.g., loan guarantees) permit. Vessel owners must take steps to insure that corporate "separateness" as an objective does not itself compromise the quality or safety of their shipping operations. Thus, a balance must be struck. The ideal, as always, is unobtainable. Nonetheless, to the extent possible and given the usual considerations regarding corporate veil piercing, the following should be considered:
a. The maritime (shipping) operations should be kept separate, if possible, from other enterprises, if any.
b. If it is possible to segregate the portion of the fleet engaged in carriage to or from U.S. waters from any other portion of the fleet, that too should be considered, subject to considerations that affect safe vessel operation.
c. Quite apart from single-vessel ownership, if it is possible to separate, for example, the operational management of tankers from that of any dry cargo portion of the fleet, that too should be examined.
If changes are required, it would be better to make them now rather than after a casualty.
V. VESSEL REQUIREMENTS
Double Hull Requirements -- By 1995, no single hull vessel of greater than 30,000 GT delivered before 1967 will be permitted to trade to the United States. By the end of the decade no single hull vessel over 23 years old will be permitted to do so and by the year 2010 no single hull vessels will be permitted at all. Newly constructed vessels contracted after June 30, 1990 or delivered after January 1, 1994 must be equipped with double hulls.
Do your vessels and newbuildings conform to the Interim Regulations concerning double hulls that the Coast Guard issued on August 12, 1992?
FACT SHEET
A sample fact sheet might include some or all of the following information:
"The M.T. INTEGRITY is a motor tanker of 99,050 deadweight tons, 52,800 gross tons and 42,500 net tons, which sails under the flag of the Republic of Liberia in accordance with the laws of that country. She is owned by the Foursquare Shipping Corporation, S.A. of the Republic of Panama under the laws relating to stock and shareholder corporations in that country. She was built in 1984.
The M.T. INTEGRITY is operated on behalf of the Foursquare Shipping Corporation, S.A. by the Allover Ship Management Corporation of Hamilton, Bermuda, under a contract between those two parties. The Allover Ship Management Corporation in turn has contracts with various agents or agency companies throughout the world to obtain necessary goods and services for the vessel and in aid of her operations.
The vessel is fully classed A1+ by the Sterling Classification Society and underwent her most recent annual survey in 1991 when she was drydocked at Rotterdam. All other certificates and SOLAS ("Safety of Life at Sea") requirements are in order and up to date. At the time of the vessel's last call at a United States port (Long Beach) some three months ago she was thoroughly examined by the United States Coast Guard and no discrepancies were found.
The M.T. INTEGRITY is insured against hull and machinery risks through Lloyds of London and the vessel is entered for protection and indemnity (i.e. liability risks) in the All-For-One-And-One-For-All Shipowner's Insurance Association (Bermuda), whereof Albert Non-Recourse & Co., Ltd. of London act as Managers.
The vessel's crew is provided directly or indirectly through the services of the Overall Ship Management Corporation and by reason of contractual arrangements and other considerations, the officers of the M.T. INTEGRITY are Greek and hold Greek and Liberian officers' licenses, and the crew of the vessel are primarily Taiwanese and hold the requisite sailing documents.
Additionally, the vessel is a party to TOVALOP (the "Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability for Oil Pollution"), and the cargo aboard is believed to be covered by CRISTAL (the "Contract Regarding a Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution"), although this would have to be directly confirmed by the cargo owner.
The vessel is currently operating under charter to the Behemoth Oil Company under a contract of charter party entered into in 1990 which is due to run for approximately five years.
[Alternatively: The M.T. INTEGRITY trades in the international tanker market and obtains cargoes in that market through normal brokerage channels, including cargoes of major oil companies. The vessel is currently operating under the provisions of a Voyage Charter to the Fineline Oil Company of Nassau, Bahamas covering a voyage from Abu Dhabi to Houston.
The bill of lading for the cargo, representing title to it, was issued to the Bottom Line Oil Company, S.A. Bottom Line was at the time of issuance of the bill of lading and presumably still is the owner of the cargo, unless the bill of lading was further negotiated while the vessel was in transit -- a circumstance not currently known by Owner.]
For purposes of the United States Oil Pollution Act of 1990 ("OPA 90"), Mr. Bete Noir, Executive Vice President of the Take-Charge Corporation, is designated as the "Qualified Individual" and is dealing with the United States Coast Guard on all matters relating to the casualty.
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Virtually all the above information will be included in the vessel's Contingency Plan on file with federal and/or state authorities. In the case of a major casualty it should be assumed that the press has at its disposal methods of obtaining that information within, at the most, 24 hours. It may, however, be appropriate to disclose such information, together with any other commonly known and relevant data about the vessel, to insure that accurate information is promptly disclosed.
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Healy & Baillie - State Pollution Law Database
By way of update, we have prepared a database which includes the following state code provisions and regulations relating to water pollution:
California
Maryland
Delaware
New Jersey
New York
Oregon
Connecticut
Texas
Louisiana
Virginia
Maine
Washington
We expect to continue adding applicable state codes and regulations, and are in the process of converting this database to a format which will allow word-specific searches.
This database places state pollution laws at our fingertips, and, when completed, will permit us to access the applicable state laws and regulations via lap-top computers during on-scene casualty investigations.
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Concepts of Attorney-Client Privilege and Attorney's Work Product in Arbitration
John
D. Kimball
Note: In the April 1992 issue of
MAINBRACE (Vol. 3, No. 1) we published an article by Mr. Kimball derived
from an address which he gave before the Society of Maritime Arbitrators
at the World Trade Institute in New York on evidentiary and discovery issues
in arbitration. This article is derived from the same paper.
1. PRIVILEGE
"Privilege" is a word which has a legal meaning at variance with common usage. In law, privilege refers to the right to protect information from disclosure. There are a few court decisions concerning the obligation of arbitrators to honor privileges generally recognized by courts. For example, it has been held that arbitrators cannot compel a witness who invokes the privilege against self-incrimination to testify against himself. This is a protection guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
The attorney-client privilege does not have the same constitutional footing. But when applicable, it provides a well-established protection against the disclosure of certain communications between client and attorney. Arbitrators are obliged to respect the attorney-client privilege and have no authority to compel a witness or party to violate it.
2. WHAT COMMUNICATIONS ARE PROTECTED BY THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE?
This is a vast topic and encompasses numerous areas that I need not touch upon. I will simply attempt to focus on the points which are most likely to arise in arbitrations.
In the ordinary case, the attorney-client privilege acts as an absolute bar to the disclosure to third parties of communications between the client and its attorneys relating to legal services rendered or to be rendered. The purpose of the attorney-client privilege "is to encourage full and frank communications between attorneys and their clients. . . ." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
"The lawyer-client privilege rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out." Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
In a leading case on the issue, the court stated that the attorney-client privilege applies if:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or seeks to become a client;
(2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate, and (b) is acting as a lawyer in connection with this communication;
(3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client, (b) without the presence of strangers, (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in legal proceedings, and
(4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F.Supp. 357, 358-359 (D.Mass. 1950).
Thus, the privilege applies with respect to "communications," whether in written or oral form. The privilege extends only to communications and not to the facts contained therein. For example, while a client may not be compelled to disclose the contents of a letter or telephone call to his attorney, he may be compelled to disclose such facts as are within his knowledge even if he later incorporated the information in a letter to his attorney. See, Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. at 395-96. The fact that a party to an arbitration has told his lawyer in confidence about the facts of the case does not clothe that information with the privilege. What is protected is the communication between a party and his lawyer about the latter's legal advice. It bears mention that the privilege can be waived by intentional or inadvertent disclosure of the information to a third party.
There is a division among the federal courts in the various circuits on the breadth of the attorney-client privilege. Some courts have held that all communications between the client and attorney are protected. See, e.g., In re Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981). Other courts, including those in the Second Circuit and other circuits, have adhered to a more narrow view and have held that only legal advice communicated in confidence to the client by the attorney is privileged. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508 (D. Conn. 1976), appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 534 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976); O'Brien v. Bd. of Education, 86 F.R.D. 548, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v. IBM, 66 F.R.D. 206, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 65 F.R.D. 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has not issued a definitive ruling on the "broad" versus "narrow" controversy, nor has the Supreme Court. As a result, there are numerous gray areas where the privilege might or might not apply. For example, it is not clear whether the privilege would protect an attorney's letter to the client reporting and commenting on information received from a third party (although such a communication might be protected by the attorney's work product rule, discussed later).
It is clear, however, that information an attorney receives from employees of the client in the course of an investigation is privileged. Upjohn Co. v. United States, supra. Thus, for example, information obtained by attorneys during an interrogation of employees of the client, such as members of a ship's crew, port captains or management personnel, would ordinarily be protected from disclosure. (The work product rule, discussed below, overlaps the privilege in this area and would also apply.)
With respect to the scope of the term "attorney," the primary requirement, as stated in United Shoe, supra, is that "in connection with this communication," the person is "acting as a lawyer." Cases since United Shoe have applied this definition to in-house counsel, See, O'Brien v. Board of Education, supra, at 549, but it is also clear that where the attorney, whether in-house or outside counsel, acts as "negotiator" or "business agent" for his client, the confidential communications between them are not privileged. J.P. Foley, supra, at 526.
In 1980, the District Court for the District of Columbia adopted numerous guidelines relating to the law of privilege. Guideline No. 7 provides:
For the purpose of the attorney-client privilege, an 'attorney' is:
(a) A person who was a duly licensed attorney at the time of the communication and who:
(i) had the title of attorney in the organization in which the person was employed; or
(ii) in the specific circumstances was acting in the capacity of giving legal advice, as evidenced by the fact that the person regularly acted in such a capacity or by other circumstantial evidence of role.
United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 615 (D.D.C. 1980).
Courts interpreting requirement (ii) have held that the nature or function of services rendered by the attorney must involve "application of law to facts or the rendering of an opinion of law in response to the client's legal inquiries." Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 61 F.R.D. 653, 660 (D.P.R. 1974); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., supra.
In Zoe Colocotroni, the defendant was the West of England P&I Association. In connection with that Association's contention that it was not subject to jurisdiction in Puerto Rico, plaintiff demanded discovery of an attorney who was listed as a club correspondent there. The attorney/correspondent claimed that the documents which plaintiff had requested were privileged. The court ordered in-camera inspection based on its finding that the documents pointed to acts by the law firm merely as a "correspondent" for the marine insurer, i.e., services of a non-legal nature, rendered for a fee. Examples included services such as "arranging for a crewman to be hospitalized or buried, engaging the services of a surveyor to adjust claims between West of England and one of its insureds, or making arrangements for the repatriation of seamen." Id. at 660. The court concluded that documents relating to such services were not privileged within the scope and intent of the phrase "acting as a lawyer."
3. THE WORK PRODUCT RULE
The "work product" rule is an adjunct of the attorney-client privilege and is designed to protect from disclosure materials prepared in anticipation of litigation, either by an attorney or by non-attorney representatives of a party.
Only material prepared "in anticipation of litigation" is protected from discovery. Discovery of such material is possible only upon a showing of "substantial need" and inability "without undue hardship" to obtain the information by other means. Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 400 (1981); Horn & Hardart Co. v. Pillsbury Co., 888 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1989); Burlington Industries v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26 (D.Md. 1974).
Does the work-product rule apply in arbitration? The answer seems to be that it does.
The test for determining whether a document was made "in anticipation of litigation" is flexible. Generally, the phrase has been interpreted to include:
. . . any time after initiation of the proceeding or such earlier time as the party who normally had tentatively formulated a claim, demand, or charge . . . When the material was prepared by a potential defendant or respondent, that person must establish the date when he received a demand or warning of charges or information from an outside source that a claim, demand or charge was in prospect.
The basic principle is that to the extent investigations, reports, etc. are prepared by a business entity in the ordinary course of business or for other non-litigation purposes they are discoverable. Where such documents are prepared because of the prospect of an actual litigation or arbitration, the rule applies. United States v. New York Foreign Trade Zone Inc., 304 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1962); Janicker v. George Washington University, 94 F.R.D. 64 (D.D.C. 1982).
What is and what is not covered? Some samples include:
a) Survey reports prepared in the ordinary course of business rather than in preparation for the arbitration are not protected. Reports prepared for the arbitration are protected. In addition, reports may be protected if prepared at a time when the parties anticipated an arbitration, whether or not attorneys have been appointed.
b) Expert reports may be protected if prepared for the arbitration.
c) Correspondence with claims adjusters may be covered by the attorney-client privilege or possibly the work-product rule.
d) Similarly, reports prepared by claims adjusters when arbitration is anticipated are covered by the rule.
4. HOW SHOULD ARBITRATORS DECIDE IF COMMUNICATIONS ARE PRIVILEGED?
If the privilege or work-product rule is invoked and challenged, how should arbitrators decide whether the communications at issue are protected? The Panel has a degree of discretion in this area. Fairness dictates that in the event of a good faith challenge to a claim of privilege, the documents should be reviewed solely to decide whether they are privileged. In litigation, when the privilege is invoked, the opposing parties are free to demand that the document be identified as to date, sender and recipient, with a general description of the contents. Normally this information alone will not provide a sufficient basis for deciding whether the document is privileged. Certainly, the Panel could decide that the Chairman alone or the Panel as a whole should review the documents in camera, i.e., privately, and make a ruling.
5. WHAT IF THE PANEL ERRS IN ALLOWING OR EXCLUDING DOCUMENTS WHICH ARE THE SUBJECT OF A CLAIMED ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE?
Suppose a document is held privileged and the Panel directs that it need not be disclosed to the other party. If the ruling is disputed a motion to vacate under Sec. 10(c) of the Arbitration Act could then be made, on the basis that the arbitrators failed to hear material or pertinent evidence. The court would review the privilege issue as part of its overall determination of the motion.
Similarly, suppose arbitrators incorrectly rule that information is not privileged and order its disclosure pursuant to their Sec. 7 powers? Would this be "undue means" under Sec. 10(c) or misbehavior prejudicing the rights of a party? Possibly. But the arbitrators would no doubt be given very broad latitude in deciding the issue.
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Shipowner Freed of Liability in Explosion
by Deborah Pines (Reprinted with the permission of the New York Law Journal,
Copyright, 1992. The New York Law Publishing Company.)
A FEDERAL JUDGE in Manhattan has taken the unusual step of exonerating a shipowner of all liability for fire damage to cargo when he found no proof of negligence before a fiery explosion destroyed a full shipment of gas oil belonging to Mobil Oil A.G.
Because the cause of the June 4, 1986, explosion -- which also killed three crew members and destroyed the $9.5 million vessel -- is uncertain, neither the shipowner, Akropan Shipping Corp., nor its operator, Admanthos Shipping Agency Inc., can be liable, Southern District Judge John F. Keenan wrote in Akropan v. National Enterprise, 86 Civ. 4873, filed Sept. 1.
Ruling after a five-day trial in April, Judge Keenan declared Mobil had failed to meet the burden of establishing negligence required by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 USC Sections 1300-1315 and the Fire Statute, 46 USC Section 182.
The suit was filed by the Panama-based shipowner and New York-based operator in 1986 to exonerate or limit liability for Mobil's cargo losses, estimated at $1.4 million.
Mobil had blamed both the owner and operator for the explosion which destroyed the M/V SOUTHERN CROSS after its crew had loaded 6,225 metric tons of gas oil at the town of Skidka, Algeria.
Among its claims was that the operator, Admanthos, created a flammable atmosphere on board through inadequate tank cleaning which was ignited by a flame on deck.
But Judge Keenan said that based on evidence at trial and submissions, the cause or causes of the explosion and fire "cannot be determined with any reasonable degree of certainty."
To accept any theories for the explosion offered by Mobil's counsel, he added, "would be to engage in speculation."
Judge Keenan found that the venting procedures employed by Admanthos were proper and that Akropan's failure to use an inert gas system was not negligent but in accordance with the contract. He also found the crew to be experienced and well supervised.
Claims for an estimated $36 million in damage to the harbor and town of Skidka have been settled in Algerian courts, lawyers said.
Donald M. Waesche and Richard W. Stone, III of Waesche, Sheinbaum & O'Regan represented Mobil A.G. Howard M. McCormack and Matthew Marion of Healy & Baillie represented Akropan and Admanthos.
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Note: On September 30, 1992, the sole claimant in the limitation proceeding filed an appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The appeal is not anticipated to be heard until early 1993.
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MAINBRACE is intended to provide general information. The articles contained in MAINBRACE do not constitute legal advice. An analysis of the facts relating to a particular issue must be accomplished before legal advice can be given.
NOTE: "Mainbrace," our Firm's cable address, in nautical terminology means the brace or rope sustaining the main yard on a ship. The Staff of "Mainbrace" consists of Nicholas J. Healy, Gordon W. Paulsen, John C. Koster, Matthew A. Marion, Betty M. Waterman and Renee Kintzer.
New York Office: 29 Broadway New York, NY 10006-3293 Telephone: (212) 943-3980 Telecopier: (212) 425-0131 |
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